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Abstract
We develop a general theoretical model to compare two different pol-
icymakers both facing tax evasion. Policymakers differs in that they aim
to maximize either the fiscal revenues (T ) as in a social-democracy as,
e.g., Sweden, or the GDP as in a capitalistic country as, e.g., the USA.
Both Bureaus can manoeuvre the tax rate and the share of tax receipts
spent to fight the tax evasion rather than to increase the public capi-
tal. Our model merges the indications of two distinct, and sometimes
conflicting, approaches to the analysis of tax evasion in that reconciling
them. We also find that the feedbacks between the private and public
sector are linked to some Laffer-type relationships usually unexplored by
the existing literature. As compared to capitalistic systems, then, our
results show that social-democracies end up imposing higher tax rates
and, possibly, more pervasive regulations. Consequently, they are likely
to suffer from larger tax-evasion-to-GDP ratios. This notwithstanding,
social-democracies spend relatively more to contrast tax dodgers. On the
other hand, T -maximizing governments have better institutional settings
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and greater employment rates. Whichever the preferred target, however,
no policymaker is able to erase totally the tax evasion, which may ex-
plain why this latter is so pervasive and persistent even among the richest
countries.
JEL Code: D73, H26, O17
Keywords: Quantitative model, Bureaucracy, Tax evasion, Regulations, Taxa-
tion.
1 Introduction
A well-known anecdote states that tax evasion is as old as taxation. By the
same token one may also add that since taxation is as old as State, the same
can be said for the tax evasion. In the words of Klepper and Nagin (1989,
p.1) ”Three things are certain in life: death, taxes, and mankind’s unrelent-
ing effort to evade both.”. The spiral ”higher tax rates, higher tax evasion” is
cited as one of the main reasons why the Roman Empire fell (Bernardi, 1970).
More recently, according to the cross section evidence collected by La Porta and
Shleifer (2008), the share of tax evasion on official GDP varies, to mention the
most conservative figures, from almost 30% in poorest countries to up 8% in
richest economies. Otherwise stated, the tax evasion is an immanent fact of life
around the world.
The shadow economy1 has some positive effects. For instance, it provides an
alternative social safety net and may be the necessary first-step for training the
new firms. This said, in both political and economic circles it is usually seen
more as a problem than as a resource, and ”zero-tolerance” announces are com-
monly heard. The presence of hidden activities, in fact, may affect the design
of national tax systems and trigger links between legal and illegal activities.
It may then impose constraints on public revenues generation and, therefore,
limit the provision of necessary public goods/services. Moreover, e.g. due to
unfair competition, shadow activities are likely to hamper the GDP. Finally, it
has been observed a strong positive correlation between tax morale and institu-
1While the shadow (unofficial, irregular...) economy takes many forms -e.g., illegal activ-
ities, unreported income (tax evasion) and the informal sector- the focus of this paper is the
tax evasion.
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tional quality (Frey and Torgler, 2007; Hug and Spo¨rri, 2011).
The pervasiveness and persistence of the tax evasion side-by-side with better
and better anti-evasion technology and worldwide zero-tolerance announces sug-
gests to examine i) why the phenomenon is so hard to eradicate practically in
all economic environments and, accordingly, ii) its effects in different economic
systems.
In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on these issues by developing a
general equilibrium model aimed at examining the theoretical links between tax
evasion, macro policies and institutions. Specifically, we study the persistence
and the effects of the tax evasion when policymakers pursue two alternative
macroeconomic targets, namely maximizing fiscal revenues (T) or the GDP.
The logic of this clear-cut in policymakers’ goal is to more easily compare these
two distinct situations which, by and large, can be thought of as representative
of, respectively, social-democracy and capitalism. Thus, our analysis can also
be useful for the understanding of what a developing or transition country may
expect to face should it follow a social-democratic rather than a capitalistic road
to develop. On the other hand, anticipating one of our results, we find that gov-
ernments cannot be revenues- and GDP-maximizers at the same time so that
a political dilemma emerge. Though this is a somewhat expected outcome, as
far as we know ours is the first model to formalize it. Even more so because
ours is a general equilibrium framework. In building our model we have bor-
rowed from both the portfolio choice tradition (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972;
Yitzhaki, 1974 and followers) and the recent institutional approach (Johnson et
al., 1998 and 1999). As we will say, these strands of research have different views
about the sign of the correlation linking tax rate and tax evasion. Therefore,
our model allows to reconcile this dissonance. We have also opted to keep the
model rather general. The idea is that the abstractness of our setting avoids
limiting the study to a peculiar analytical setting. In fact, we can afford to
not rely on explicit functions for the parameters which, as e.g. in the case of
variables describing the institutional setting, may turn out to be tricky. The
generality of the setting means that our model nests several specifications and,
accordingly, it is very robust.
Other contributions of our paper that we want to stress are the following. Com-
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paring two different economic systems - such as, say, Sweden and the USA -
with a special focus on tax evasion allows us to uncover and discuss some new
Laffer-type non linearities. These latter come from the feedbacks between the
private and public sector and are typically neglected in the existing literature
(Section 2). Then, we offer a theoretical framework that could help to better
understand the empirical findings reported by several papers often based on just
sketched theoretical considerations (see, e.g., Friedman et al., 2000 and John-
son et al., 1999 just to mention two papers dealing with the set of variables
here under scrutiny). In fact, given the easy-to-imagine data problems affecting
variables such as tax evasion, institutional efficiency, etc. (low quality, reduced
time series and cross section comparability, etc.,), our conceptual robust setting
can act like a map that gives coherence to empirical inquiry.
Side by side with the mentioned policy dilemma, other results stem from our
analysis. As compared to GDP-maximizing states, social-democracies tend to
impose higher tax rates, more pervasive regulations and, consequently, to suf-
fer from larger tax-evasion-to-GDP ratios. All this in spite of the fact that
social-democracies spend relatively more to contrast tax dodgers than capitalis-
tic countries. On the other hand, revenues maximizing governments can afford
to have better institutional settings and greater participation rates. In no case,
however, the Bureau is able to erase totally the tax evasion, which may explain
why this latter is so pervasive and persistent all around the world.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some
literature related to our topic. Section 3 contains the constitutive elements of
the theoretical model. Section 4 and 5 deal with the optimization problems of
the private sector and the State, respectively. In section 6 the theoretical find-
ings are discussed with a focus on two representative cases. Some supporting
evidence is also presented. The last section collects concluding remarks. The
proofs of the main results are reported in the Appendix.
2 A Brief Literature Review
Despite its sheer magnitude and ever-lasting presence, the macroeconomic con-
sequences of tax evasion on revenues and, especially, on output loss, has received
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relatively little attention. As for public revenues loss, in a simple Keynesian
model, Peacock and Shaw (1982) were the first to show that, provided the
marginal net propensity to spend is less than unity, tax evasion decreases the
tax revenue. In a more general framework, Ricketts (1984) confirms the negative
effect of tax evasion upon the tax revenue. Years later, Lai and Chang (1988),
Von Zameck (1989), and Lai et al. (1995) showed that tax evasion may even
lead to an increase in the tax revenue. A common problem with these papers
is the lack of microfoundations. More recently, Turnovsky and Basher (2008)
have developed a microfounded two-sector model and have examined the role of
the informal sector in limiting the governments ability to increase tax revenues.
As for more direct links between growth and tax evasion, Caballe´ and Panade´s
(2000) have analyzed how the tax compliance policy affects the rate of economic
growth. They consider a microfounded overlapping generations model in which
the paths of all the involved macroeconomic variables are endogenously deter-
mined and perform comparative statics analyses of changes in both the proba-
bility of inspection and the penalty fee imposed on tax evaders. They show the
nonoptimality from the growth viewpoint of an inspection policy inducing truth-
ful revelation of income for exogenously given levels of both the penalty and the
tax rates. Alike, Chen’s (2003) microfounded model of endogenous growth has
inquired into the effects of three government policies on tax rate, tax evasion,
and economic growth. These three policies are as follows: increasing the unit
cost of tax evasion, raising punishment and fines, and increasing the probabil-
ity of detection. He finds that the three policies are quantitatively effective in
discouraging tax evasion, but have small growth effects. These latter increase
when the public capital has very strong positive externalities. Ihrig and Moe
(2004) have analized a simple dynamic model of an agent who chooses to allo-
cate time between the formal and informal sector while accounting for taxation
policies. They argue that their model explain why, as an economy grows from
a low level of real GDP per capita, changes in informal employment are large.
From the normative standpoint these authors suggest that while reductions in
the tax rate, combined with increased enforcement, reduce the size of the infor-
mal sector, tax rate reductions and penalties for evasion are the most effective.
Another strand of research (Johnson et al., 1998 and 1999; Friedman et al.,
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2000) has been pointing out the role of institutions in explaining the pres-
ence/influence of the tax evasion in/on economic systems. Basically, it argues
that the efficiency of the public sector is connected with the tax evasion because
the low quality of bureaucracy reduces the probability to detect tax dodgers
and this increases, other things being equal, the optimal share of hidden income
chosen by agents. In turn, this stops achieving sufficient revenues to fund good
institutions. Furthermore, bad governments offer low quality and insufficient
public services, making people less willing to pay for them and more willing to
search for alternative, hidden, service networks.2. These studies underline that
another stable equilibrium, opposite to the bad one, is possible. This is why this
”institutional” literature is sometimes referred to as the two-equilibria frame-
work. Rich countries cluster in this second polar situation, which can be labeled
”good equilibrium” because small hidden sectors, large fiscal revenues, high tax
rates and honest/appreciated institutions consistently coexist. Thus, in sharp
contrast with the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) traditional result, tax rate and
tax evasion may be negatively related. Yet, recently Bovi and Dell’Anno (2010),
focusing exclusively on good equilibria, have found empirical evidence that tax
rate and tax evasion are significantly positively related.3
Other papers establishing multiple equilibria are those of Myles and Naylor
(1996), Rosser et al. (2003) and Cule and Fulton (2009). Myles and Naylor
(1996) develop a social custom and conformity model of tax evasion and obtain
two equilibria: one with no evasion and one with total evasion. According to
Rosser et al. (2003), then, the returns to labor of participating in shadow activ-
ities are increasing for a while as the relative size of the hidden sector increases
and then decrease beyond some point. This can create a critical threshold that
can generate two distinct stable equilibrium states, one with a small under-
ground sector and one with a large underground sector. Finally, in Cule and
Fulton (2009) the source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created
2This spiral is in line both with the results of Hanousek and Palda (2004), and with the
observed strong positive correlation between tax morale and institutional quality (Frey and
Torgler, 2007).
3In fact, in a sub sample analysis targeted to richer countries, even Friedman et al., (2000)
did not find evidence against the traditional positive correlation between tax rate and tax eva-
sion. Results by Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) support the positive correlation.
6
by business and tax inspection cultures. Specifically, in bad equilibria (high
cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse
impacts and increase cheating. Somewhat mirroring the institutional literature
these papers deal especially with bad equilibria, whereas the tax evasion is likely
to be persistent.
3 The Theoretical Framework
In building our model we have borrowed from both the portfolio choice tradition
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974 and followers) and the recent in-
stitutional approach. Our aim is to study the tax-evasion-related links between
these two agents when the Bureau is either GDP- or revenues-maximizing. In
our model there are two players, a representative private agent and the govern-
ment. The former solves standard consumption-leisure optimization problems,
with the exception that she may hide some income. It is worth noticing that,
should the representative agent hide or declare all of her income, the economic
system would be, respectively, totally under- or totally overground. As we will
see, our model enables the informal sector to remain part of the economy in
equilibrium. Since, mature or not, data inform that all economic systems have
shadow sectors, the mixed equilibrium is consistent with empirical observations.
The optimal share of tax evasion chosen by individuals is constrained by the ex-
pected penalty and tax evasion-related costs (e.g., sheltering efforts. See Cross
and Shaw, 1982). As in Barro (1990), the private sector benefits from public
capital.
In order to maximize either fiscal receipts or the GDP, the State decides the tax
rate and the share of public outlay devoted to fight the tax evasion rather than
to increase the public capital.4 These two goals should be seen as representative
of the policies usually implemented, respectively, in mature social-democratic
(say, Sweden) and capitalistic (say, the USA) countries. Several Laffer-type re-
lationships emerge in our context.
Beyond the usual mnemonic L (labor input), Y (output), G and T (respectively,
4The term ”public capital” contains all the growth-enhancing items potentially available
for policymakers.
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public outlays and revenues), throughout the paper we will use the following no-
tations:
• r ∈ [0, 1] is the probability to detect a tax dodger;5
• t ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate;
• y ∈ [0, 1] is the share of undeclared income on total income;
• e is an index that measures the level of regulations. For homogeneity, e
is assumed to vary between [0, 1] with e = 0 indicating the case of no
regulation (disorder), and e = 1 the case of totally regulated economy
(dictatorship);
• α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the public expenditure G spent to increase r. It
represents the fraction of public money directly devoted to fight the tax
evasion.6 This kind of outlay should be meant as comprehensive of both
”sticks”, e.g. providing for tax inspectors, and ”carrots”, e.g. reducing the
complexity of the tax system. Instead, 1− α is the fraction of G devoted
to increase/improve the public capital, the only other outlay available
for policymakers. As in Barro (1990), we assume that public capital has
positive external effects on GDP.
For simplicity, in our model T = G and we define r as an increasing continuous
function of α that we will write as r = r(α). Therefore, r is invertible, i.e. there
exists a function p such that:
r(α) = r˜ ⇔ α = p(r˜). (1)
It is important to note since now that good institutions (i.e. those with both
large r and, as we will see, α) can afford to collect and, in turn, to spend, large
amounts of revenues. Accordingly, despite their relatively lower 1 − α, good
institutions have higher levels of public capital than bad ones.
5Our model examines the situation in which, ex post, tax dodgers are not detected but,
ex ante, there is a probability r > 0 that this happens. Consequently, though taxpayers take
into account the expected penalty in their optimization problem, no evader actually pays the
penalty. It turns out that the State collects no money via penalties. Considering this extra
gain, however, just complicates the model leaving our conclusions unaffected.
6For a paper focusing on this topic see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) and Mayshar, 1991.
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Following both traditional and institutional approaches, we argue that the share
of undeclared income depends on t, e, r:
y = y(t, e, r). (2)
In our context regulations can be thought of as the level of social control of
business (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). From the taxpayer’s standpoint fulfilling
regulations is costly and, therefore, they can be thought of as a tax in disguise.
As a consequence, regulations affect positively the share of tax evasion. As we
shall explain in Section 5, the Bureau cannot afford to freely manage the level
of regulations. This is why we do not put regulations among the policymakers’
instruments. The output Y depends on labor input and on α
Y = g(L,α). (3)
Detailed comments on this function are collected in the next section.
4 The Private Sector
Households maximize their utility, under the budget constraint, pinning down
both the optimal share of undeclared income (y∗), and the optimal quantity of
labor (L∗). The utility function of the private sector depends on L and C, and
can be defined as U(L,C). U satisfies the usual properties:
∂U(L,C)
∂C
> 0;
∂U(L,C)
∂L
< 0. (4)
The consumption function depends on y, Y and t, it is defined as C(t, y, Y ) and,
obviously:
∂C(t, y, Y )
∂y
> 0;
∂C(t, y, Y )
∂Y
> 0;
∂C(t, y, Y )
∂t
< 0. (5)
Tax evasion is costly both because of the expected penalty to be caught and
because hiding an ever growing income level is a more and more tricky activity
(Cross and Shaw, 1982). The cost function is K(r, y, Y ), with
K(r, 0, Y ) = 0;
∂K(r, y, Y )
∂y
> 0;
∂K(r, y, Y )
∂r
> 0;
∂K(r, y, Y )
∂Y
> 0. (6)
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The household must solve the following problem: maxy,L U(L,C(t, y, g(L,α)))−K(r(α), y, g(L,α))s.t. H(C(t, y, g(L,α))) = 0, (7)
where H = 0 is the budget constraint.
It is worth noting that the role of y as decision variable does not contrast with
the definition of y provided in (2): indeed, the dependence of y on the triple
(t, e, r) states simply that the decisions taken by the private sector are affected
also on the institutional (exogenous) parameters t, e, r. More specifically, we hy-
pothesize that taxpayers take t, r, e, α as given and that they are indifferent in
paying the same amount of different combinations of taxes, expected penalties,
license fees, and the like. Let us fix t, e, α ∈ [0, 1] and assume that the functions
U , K and H behave well, so that there exists a solution of the optimization
problem (7) given by the couple (y∗(t, e, r(α)), L∗). The optimal level of output
depends7 on α, and will be denoted as Y ∗ = Y ∗(α) = g(L∗, α).
How are α and L∗ related? From the macroeconomic point of view, Munnell
(1992) has claimed that the correlation between (1 − α) and Y/L is positive.
That is to say, for any given Y , α and L∗ are positively related. From the
microeconomic standpoint, then, it has been argued that a lower α is associated
to a bigger evasion. It, in turn, increases expected consumption for any given
amount of leisure, this latter increases, and labor supply declines (Slemrod and
Yitzhaki, 2002). Thus, once again, L∗ = L∗(α) may be thought of as an in-
creasing function of α.
As for the optimal output level, it is a function of α, i.e. Y ∗ = Y ∗(α) =
g(L∗(α), α) and we assume that Y ∗ and α are linked such a way to produce a
Laffer-shaped curve, i.e. there exists α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
∂g(L∗(α),α)
∂α > 0, for α < α¯;
∂g(L∗(α),α)
∂α < 0, for α > α¯;
∂g(L∗(α),α)
∂α = 0, for α = α¯;
(8)
The rationale behind is that countries severely lacking in public capital (i.e.
with a very high α) or fiscal apparatuses (i.e. with a very low α) are likely
to have lower Y than those with less extreme situations. We now turn our
7See also the discussion in Acemoglu et al. (2005).
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attention to the links between y∗ and t. A logical, and traditional (Allingham
and Sandmo, 1972), assumption is that the optimal undeclared income y∗(t, e, r)
is an increasing function of t. We postpone the discussion on the relationship
between y∗ and the parameters e and r (or α) to the next section.
As for the relationship between Y ∗, L∗ and the tax rate t we are able to prove
that they are directly related. In fact, since C is continuous and increasing with
respect to Y ceteris paribus, then it is also invertible, i.e. given e and α, there
exists a function RYe,α such that
C∗t = C(t, y
∗(t, e, r(α)), Y ∗)⇔ Y ∗e,α = RYe,α(C∗t ).
Given e, α ∈ [0, 1], we can write Y ∗e,α as a function of the tax rate as follows:
Y ∗e,α = Y ∗e,α(t) = RYe,α(C
∗
t ).
By the same token of equation (8), we write the lafferian relation between Y ∗e,α
and t, i.e. there exists t¯e,α ∈ (0, 1) such that
dY ∗e,α(t)
dt > 0, for t < t¯e,α;
dY ∗e,α(t)
dt < 0, for t > t¯e,α;
dY ∗e,α(t)
dt = 0, for t = t¯e,α.
(9)
Furthermore, since g in (3) is continuous and increasing with respect to L, then
it is also invertible. For a fixed α ∈ [0, 1], we denote dα as the inverse of g with
respect to L at the level α, and write:
Y ∗e,α = g(L
∗, α) ⇔ L∗α = dα(Y ∗e,α). (10)
Equation (10) allows us to write L∗ as a function of t: L∗α = L∗α(t) = dα(Y ∗e,α(t)).
5 The State
In our model, policymakers have two instruments to pursue one of two alter-
native targets. The government decides i) the tax rate and ii) the share of
revenues devoted to fight the tax evasion rather than to increase the public
capital in order to maximize either its revenues or the GDP. These goals should
be seen as representative of the policies usually implemented in, respectively,
social-democratic and capitalistic countries. We will show that, as expected,
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policymakers cannot maximize both T and Y contemporaneously. Another po-
tential policy tool in our context is the level of regulation. We have chosen not
to consider it as a device because, to some extent, the Bureau cannot afford to
freely manage the level of regulations. In fact, as fairly noted by Glaeser and
Shleifer (2003), the American and European societies are much richer today
than they were a century ago, yet they are also vastly more regulated. The
structural factor behind this is that modern good, financial and labor markets
inevitably need regulations to protect weaker agents (respectively, consumers,
savers and workers). The recent developments in financial markets and the fol-
lowing, strong, reaction of the Bureaus are an undisputable example of what
we are talking about. Our model points out that there are threshold values
activating non linear associations among the variables under scrutiny. In this
section we explain the rich relationships between the involved variables from the
ruler’s standpoint, and how these connections affect the performances of T - or
Y -maximizing governments.
We model the quality of the institutional setting as depending on the levels of
regulation, e, and the probability to be detected, r. Specifically, we define a
function a of the variables e and r such that a(e, r) describes the institutional
setting of a country with regulation level e and probability of detection r. a is a
continuous function with respect to e and r. Henceforth we use the convention
that a country with institutional index a1 has a weaker institutional setting
than a country with institutional index a2 if and only if a1 < a2.
As already mentioned, there are reasons to think that r is positively correlated
with the efficiency of the Bureau. Thus, a(e, r) is an increasing function of r.
Moreover, since r increases with respect to α, then a(e, r(α)) increases with
respect to α as well. Therefore, a is an invertible function of α, and there exists
an increasing function b such that
a = a(e, r(α)) ⇔ α = b(a). (11)
In contrast, the behavior of a with respect to e is more complicated. The
parameter e is non linearly linked to the bureaucratic structure of the State. The
idea is that both disorder (e=0) and dictatorship (e=1) are bad institutional
settings. More in general, we claim that above a certain critical value of e the
government’s activity becomes so intrusive (”from the cradle to the grave”) that
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the Bureau just cannot avoid over-regulating. For instance, public goods and
services might be offered at prices lower than the market ones, giving rise to
an excess of demand that needs to be regulated. In addition, the government’s
size may trigger over-regulations simply to justify its own presence. So we
assume that, for any α ∈ [0, 1], the institutional index a(e, r(α)) admits a global
maximum in a critical threshold e = e¯α ∈ (0, 1). More formally:
∂a(e,r(α))
∂e > 0, for e < e¯α;
∂a(e,r(α))
∂e < 0, for e > e¯α;
∂a(e,r(α))
∂e = 0, for e = e¯α.
(12)
Substantially, relation (12) means that the maximum level of the institutional
setting index can be obtained in countries with neither too light nor too heavy
regulation frameworks.
The dependence of y∗ on regulation e and on the probability of detection r
can be explicated through the institutional parameter a. To this end, we write
y∗(t, e, r) = y∗(t, a(e, r)), assuming that y∗ decreases with respect to the institu-
tional setting parameter a. Consequently, y∗ decreases as α increases. Finally,
in view of the optimization problems assessed in the next section, we note that
tax revenues can be written both as:
T = t[(1− y∗)Y ∗]. (13)
and as
T = T (a, t). (14)
Equation (13) includes one of the two policy instruments, namely the tax rate t
(the other is α), and the three policy variables (T , y∗, and Y ∗) we are focusing
on. In the following sections we will study how the instruments affect these
variables. Finally, note that formula (14) emphasizes the relation between tax
revenues, the institutional setting (a) and the tax rate.
5.1 The Optimizing State
This section is devoted to the analysis of the two optimization problems faced
by the State.
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The first goal consists in solving the following:
max
t,α
T (a(e, r(α)), t). (15)
In order to tackle the problem, we first analyze the behavior of the tax revenues
with respect to both t and α.
Following the standard literature, there exists a threshold for the tax rate t˜e,α ∈
(0, 1) such that: 
∂T (a(e,r(α),t)
∂t > 0, for t < t˜e,α;
∂T (a(e,r(α),t)
∂t < 0, for t > t˜e,α;
∂T (a(e,r(α),t)
∂t = 0, for t = t˜e,α.
(16)
It is important to observe that (16) comes out from the model. Indeed we argue
that, ceteris paribus, a change in the tax rate creates two opposite effects: i)
the tax revenues T (a(e, r(α), t) increases linearly with respect to t (see (13)); ii)
the tax revenues are reverse U-shaped with respect to t, as (9) and (13) state.
Formula (16) gives the usual Laffer-type relation between tax revenues and tax
rate when the latter is stronger than the former.
Yet we also stress that, unlike the mainstream literature, condition (16) im-
plies that the government revenues of a country with institutional parameter
a(e, r(α)) follow an institutions-conditional Laffer curve, t˜e,α being the optimal
Laffer tax rate. Now, consider e, t ∈ [0, 1]. There exists a threshold α such that:
∂T (a(e,r(α)),t)
∂α > 0, for α < α;
∂T (a(e,r(α)),t)
∂α < 0, for α > α;
∂T (a(e,r(α)),t)
∂α = 0, for α = α.
(17)
Even the relation (17) stems from the model. As, ceteris paribus, the parameter
α changes, two contrasting behaviors emerge: i) tax revenues T (a(e, r(α)), t)
are reverse U-shaped with respect to α (see eqs. (8) and (13)); ii) tax revenues
increase, since y∗ decreases. Similarly to the previous reasoning, we argue that
the former effect is more relevant than the latter, hence formula (17). An
excessive α, in fact, while reducing tax evasion also hampers the public capital
accumulation and, hence, output. Due to the diminished taxable income, tax
collection shrinks.
Remark 1. Due to the presence of the ceteris paribus positive effect of the tax
rate on tax revenues, it is immediate to see that the threshold for the tax rate
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t¯e,α ∈ (0, 1) defined in (9) cannot be greater than t˜e,α. By the same token, we
have α > α¯, where α¯ is defined in (8). As we shall see, this outcome will turn
out to be useful when comparing different policies.
Following the argument above, it also turns out that, if a1 < a2, then
T (a1, t) < T (a2, t), for any t ∈ (0, 1].
The optimization problem (15) is then solved by the pair (t∗, α∗) = (t˜e,α, α),
i.e.:
max
t,α
T (a(e, r(α)), t) = T (a(e, r(α∗)), t∗) = T (a(e, r(α)), t˜e,α). (18)
Let us now examine the second goal. By (3) and (10), the problem can be
formalized as follows:
max
t,α
g(α,L∗α(t)). (19)
The solution of the optimization problem (19) comes out from the analysis of the
household’s output. In this case, formulas (8) and (9) give that Y ∗ is reverse
U-shaped both with respect to both t and α. Therefore, the solution of the
optimization problem is (t∗, α∗) = (t¯e,α¯, α¯), and we have:
max
t,α
g(α,L∗α(t)) = g(α
∗, L∗α∗(t
∗)) = g(t¯e,α¯, L∗α¯(t¯e,α¯)). (20)
5.2 Some Remarkable Results
The optimization performed in the previous section allow us to emphasize some
important features of our model.
Let us start from the analysis of the T -maximizing State.
The function T is well-behaved so that we can explicitly describe how e and α
affects the optimal tax rate t∗ in defining t˜e,α. In fact, by applying the Implicit
Function’s Theorem (IFT), there exists a function t∗ = t∗(a) that is continuous
and such that
∂T (a, t∗(a))
∂t
= 0, ∀ a ∈ R. (21)
The IFT and equation (21) allow us to think of the Laffer optimal tax rate t∗
as a function of the institutional setting a. Following Friedman et al (2000), we
assume that t∗(a) is an increasing function. Also, conditional on any given a,
we define the Laffer-optimal (maximum) revenue level T ∗a := T (a, t
∗(a)). Since
T is positively related to a, then T ∗a is increasing with respect to a as well.
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We now limit the analysis to the situation in which a country, with an insti-
tutional setting a, levies the optimal tax rate t∗(a) and reaches the maximum
level of revenue T ∗a . Accordingly, the following analysis will be restricted to the
optimal tax rate, t = t∗. It is worth noticing that we use this restriction only
because in whichever point different from the lafferian top tax rate our results
are simply reinforced. This said, we ask: what are the features of this peculiar
”best case” fiscal framework?
• T ∗ decreases with respect to the undeclared level of income y∗, as it nat-
urally should be.
• Since t∗ = t∗(a) is continuous and increasing, then it is also invertible.
Thus, there exists a function k such that
t∗ = t∗(a) ⇔ a = k(t∗). (22)
A standard analytical argument gives that k is continuous and increasing.
From (22) and since t∗ is increasing with respect to a, it turns out that only
countries with a high-quality institutional setting can afford to impose a large
optimal tax rate threshold t∗(a). This is in line with the analysis by Friedman
et al. (2000). Notwithstanding the high tax rate, this kind of Bureau enjoys a
small optimal share of undeclared income because of the high expected penalty
facing its taxpayers.
A further mathematical implication of the connections between a and y∗ is the
invertibility of y∗ as a function of a. There exists a decreasing function m such
that
y∗ = y∗(t∗(a), a) ⇔ a = m(y∗). (23)
Condition (23) has a deep as well as logic significance: an increase in the share
of undeclared income, y∗, worsens the institutional setting of a country.
This outcome is in stark contrast with the positive correlation between t and
y∗ highlighted by the standard approach to the tax evasion. In particular, as
we will show, our theoretical model points out that for the maximum level of
institutional setting, a¯, the share of undeclared income is minimized. However,
the institutional setting level a¯ cannot be attained. As a consequence, the the-
oretical minimum level of undeclared income is outside the strategies available
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to the government. As such, it is not a practicable equilibrium of the economic
system.
By the arguments explained above on the institutional setting parameter a, we
are able to show that self-consistent, feasible, triplets do not allow to obtain a
situation with zero tax evasion. We keep analyzing the ”best case”, that is the
optimal lafferian State: (t, α) = (t∗, α∗).
Fix e ∈ [0, 1] and define the function fe of the variable α such that
fe(α∗) = T ∗a(e,r(α∗)) = T (a(e, r(α
∗)), t∗(a(e, r(α∗)))). (24)
As stated above, the optimal revenue T ∗a is continuous and increasing with
respect to a; moreover, a = a(e, r(α∗)) is a continuous and increasing function
with respect to α∗. Thus, the function fe defined in (24) is continuous and
increasing, and this implies the existence of its inverse Qe, that is continuous
and increasing and works as follows:
fe(α∗) = T ∗a ⇔ α∗ = qe(T ∗a ). (25)
Consider now the optimal regulation threshold defined implicitly in (12).
Fix α∗ ∈ [0, 1] and define the function f1,α∗ of the variable e such that
f1,α∗(e) = T ∗a(e,r(α∗)) = T (a(e, r(α
∗)), t∗(a(e, r(α∗)))), ∀ e ∈ [0, e¯α∗ ]. (26)
T ∗a is continuous and increasing with respect to a and a = a(e, r(α∗)) is con-
tinuous and increasing with respect to e in [0, e¯]. Thus, there exists its inverse
q1,α∗ that is increasing and such that
f1,α∗(e) = T ∗a ⇔ e = q1,α∗(T ∗a ), ∀T ∗a ∈ [T ∗a(0,r(α∗)), T ∗a(e¯α∗ ,r(α∗))]. (27)
A very similar argument gives that, if we fix α∗ ∈ [0, 1] and define the function
f2,α∗ of the variable e such that
f2,α∗(e) = T ∗a(e,r(α∗)) = T (a(e, r(α
∗)), t∗(a(e, r(α∗)))), ∀ e ∈ [e¯α∗ , 1], (28)
then there exists a decreasing function q2,α∗ such that
f2,α∗(e) = T ∗a ⇔ e = q2,α∗(T ∗a ), ∀T ∗a ∈ [T ∗a(1,r(α∗)), T ∗a(e¯α∗ ,r(α∗))]. (29)
The true meaning of the formalized relations between Laffer-optimal revenues
and regulations can be stated as follows: a greater level of revenues implies that
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a country spending α (to increase r) is improving its bureaucratic apparat so
that e is approaching e¯α, i.e. the ”Laffer-optimal” regulation level.
More importantly, the relationship between the couples (T ∗, α∗) and (T ∗, e)
formalized in (25), (27) and (29), allows us to state the existence of a relationship
between e and α∗. Specifically, there exists a function h such that α∗ = h(e)
and 
h′(e) > 0, for e < e¯α∗ ;
h′(e) < 0, for e > e¯α∗ ;
h′(e) = 0, for e = e¯α∗ .
(30)
Our model has important implications.
Next Proposition proves that the T -maximizing State has some constraints in
choosing the share of public expenditure devoted to fight the tax evasion:
Proposition 2. The level α∗ = 1 cannot be reached.
Another intriguing result of our analysis deals with the persistence proper-
ties, and the consequent ineluctability, of the tax evasion:
Proposition 3. Given e ∈ [0, 1], then
y∗(t∗(a(e, r(α∗))), e, r(α∗)) > 0.
Let us now turn our attention to the output-maximizing State. In this case
next Proposition will show that, starting from (20), the underground economy
cannot be avoided:
Proposition 4. Given e ∈ [0, 1], then
y∗(t¯e,α¯, e, r(α¯)) > 0.
Whichever the preferred target, then, another situation in which the tax
evasion can be reduced to zero is when the ruler sets the tax rate equal to zero.
Although clearly this is too extreme a case, our model allows to conceptualize it.
If a country applies a tax rate t = 0, then (22) gives that the institutional setting
of the country is a = g(0). Since g is an increasing function, then g(0) = a¯ = 0.
As expected, t = 0 is incompatible with functional values of the other variables
of the model. Moreover,
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Remark 5. If the only aim of the State were to minimize the tax evasion, it
should implement t∗ = 0 and/or α∗ = 1. The former is unrealistic and the
latter is impossible (see Proposition 2). This is a supporting argument to the
unavoidability of the underground economy.
All in all, the State is not able to erase totally the tax evasion.
Finally, by Remark 1, we have that the tax rate which maximizes the output
cannot be greater than the one maximizing the tax revenues. This fact implies
that the fiscal policies that a country should implement to maximize the output
are lighter than the ones useful for the maximization of the revenues.
Remark 6. Our model is able to conceptualize bad and good equilibria. The
former are characterized by a low level of tax rate and institutional setting and
a high level of tax evasion. Good equilibria, instead, are identified by a high level
of tax rate and institutional setting, and a low level of tax evasion.
The arguments outlined in Remark 6 come out directly from the relationship
between the variables a, y∗ and t∗. Specifically, formula (22) explains that t∗
and a are positively correlated, while (23) states that y∗ and a are negatively
correlated.
6 The Model and the Reality
This section offers a simple attempt to see how our theoretical model is able to
match the real world. In doing that we focus on two rich countries, likely lying
in good equilibria and that differ with respect to their macroeconomic goals,
namely revenues and output maximization. As mentioned, these goals could
be seen as representative of the policies implemented in, respectively, social-
democratic (say, Sweden, henceforth denoted with subscript 1) and capitalistic
(say, the USA, henceforth denoted with subscript 2) countries.
Before going through the data, it is worth recalling that ours is a static gen-
eral equilibrium model. Thus, what is important here is to see whether our
theoretical suggestions match the systematic tendencies of data with no consid-
eration about dynamics.8. The generality of our model is also mirrored in the
8For a recent example of a dynamic analysis dealing with the tax evasion, see Cerqueti and
Coppier (2011).
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definitions of some of the variables we are dealing with. Just to mention, in our
economy there is just one tax rate, the institutional setting may be thought of
as including several (potentially strongly correlated) variables such as corrup-
tion, the rule of law and so on. This means that, hopefully, further (empirical
and theoretical) analyses can stem from our model. Yet, there is an obvious
trade off between the number of variables and the analytical tractability of a
model.9 Also, as already underlined, our main aim is the theoretical concep-
tualization, not the quantification, of the links between the variables. These
latter, then, are non linear and, accordingly, not easy to examine by standard
econometric tools.10 On the positive side, we can afford to compare just two
economic systems. Obviously, it greatly simplifies the comparisons and reduces
data problems. Finally, it should be clear that the less reliable data are, the
greater is the need for the empirical analysis to be supported by sound theoret-
ical indications. This said, we are eventually ready to see whether the real life
situation matches the analytical structural prescriptions of the model.
According to our model, t1 > t2. Indeed, the tax rates that a revenues-
maximizing country imposes on citizens is greater than the one imposed by
an output-maximizing country, as Remark 1 shows. This result fits the evi-
dence of a structurally larger tax rate in Sweden than in the USA. In Figure 1
the time series of the annual tax rates11 applied in Sweden and in the USA in
the period 1990:2009 are plotted.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Caption: t1 (continuous line) is constantly greater than t2 (dotted line)
Since t1 > t2, our model states also that a1 > a2. Indeed, relations (22) show
that the institutional parameter a increases with respect to t. This result is in
line with both the common wisdom that a mature social democracy is featured
by a top-quality institutional setting and qualitative data such as the World
9For instance, an intriguing improvement of our model could be inserting income distri-
bution and/or, more explicitly, corruption in our framework. Hillman (2004) describes how
corruption, akin tax evasion in our model, reduces tax revenues and affects economic devel-
opment.
10This may explain the different results obtained by splitting world-wide samples as, e.g.,
in Friedman et al. (2000) with respect to Bovi and Dell’Anno (2010).
11Source: OECD
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1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2003
y1 18.8 20.5 24.2 24.8 23.8 22.4
y2 7.2 8.9 9.6 9.8 9.5 9.2
Table 1: The estimate of the shadow economy in Sweden and USA. Source:
Bovi and Dell’Anno (2010).
Bank’s ”Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality”.12
Moreover, we also have that α1 > α2. This result is grounded on a1 > a2,
by using the relations in (11). It sounds palatable and somewhat in line with
the study by van der Weele on tax evasion (2009) - a country with very high
statutory tax rates needs to check tax evasion more forcefully than a country
where the taxpayers are not request to contribute so heavily.
Lastly, we have L1 > L2. This finding is based on α1 > α2, since L increases
with respect to α. In fact, data shows that the employment rates in well-
established social democracies are structurally larger than the ones recorded
in capitalistic countries. Though ours is a theoretical model, we are neverthe-
less strongly tempted to speculate that this may be so due to well-functioning
publicly-funded social infrastructures allowing, e.g., women to participate more
actively in the labor market. This result is in line with the employment rates of
the females in Sweden and in the USA. In Figure 2 the time series of the annual
female employment rates13 in Sweden and in the USA in the period 1999:2009
are plotted - once again the structural indications of our model are mirrored in
the trend of the data.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Caption: L1 (continuous line) is constantly greater than L2 (dotted line)
Despite the availability of reliable data referring to hidden activities is almost
by definition narrowed, some consideration based on the ranking appears rea-
sonable. Specifically, figures say that y1 > y2 (see Table 1).
On that, our model guarantees that the value of y increases with respect to
t and decreases with a. Therefore, we argue that the legal tax rate in Sweden
12See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm.
13Source: Eurostat.
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is so high that, in spite of the presence of very well functioning institutions, the
Sweden’s underground sector is tendencially larger than that of the USA. This
finding is in line with both the classical theoretical prescriptions of Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) and the empirical outcomes by Bovi and Dell’Anno (2010)
that, like us, focus on rich economies.
Given the Laffer relations for T with respect to t, and Y with respect to α, we
are not able to theoretically conclude which is the greater between T1/Y1 and
T2/Y2. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that T1/Y1 > T2/Y2. This means that
an increase in the legal tax rate has a greater negative impact on output than
on the tax revenues when a country maximizes the tax revenues.
7 Concluding Remarks
The existing literature on tax evasion typically deals with its measurement,
causes, consequences and remedies. Less analysed, at least explicitly, is the rea-
son why the tax evasion is so persistent and how it impacts, given its longevity,
on the long run macroeconomic performances of different economic systems.
This paper has exploited both traditional and recent indications to conceptual-
ize the relationships between taxation, institutional setting and tax evasion. In
doing that, and since tax evasion is a fact of life even in rich countries, this pa-
per has focussed on the comparison between the macroeconomic performances
of two well-established Bureaus - a social-democracy and a capitalistic country
- which aim to maximize, respectively, fiscal revenues and GDP. The theoreti-
cal model is general and, as a consequence, it is robust to several specifications.
Furthermore, it reconciles two important strands of research and it allows to ex-
amine a number of usually overlooked non linear ”Laffer-type” connections. As
per the comparison between economic systems, the model leads to the following
results. Governments cannot be revenues- and GDP-maximizers at the same
time and the effects of the tax evasion are different according to the different
policy targets pursued by the State. As compared to GDP-maximizing states,
then, revenues maximizing ones are featured by higher tax rates, more pervasive
regulations and, consequently, from larger tax evasion despite they spend rela-
tively more to contrast tax dodgers. On the other hand, revenues maximizing
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governments can afford to have better institutional settings and greater partic-
ipation rates. This said, in no case the Bureau is able to erase totally the tax
evasion, which may explain why this latter is so pervasive and persistent even in
affluent economies i.e., in the words of the institutional literature, even in good
equilibria. As a consequence, differently politically-oriented mature countries
may not share the same good equilibrium that, accordingly, is not unique.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us fix e ∈ [0, 1] and assume α∗ = 1. Formula
(30) assures that e = e¯α∗ = e¯1. Hence we get a(e, r(α∗)) = a(e¯1, r(1)) = a¯.
From (22) and since the tax rate is increasing with respect to the institutional
setting parameter a, we have that t∗ = t∗(a¯) is the maximum level of lafferian
tax rate. This means that the share of undeclared income y∗(t∗) reaches its
maximum level, since y∗(t∗) is increasing. The analysis of the Laffer revenue T ∗
points out that two inconciliable situations should coexist:
• T ∗ must reach its maximum level as function of t∗(a¯) (see formula (16)).
• T ∗ = T ∗(y∗) must reach its minimum level, since the level of the optimal
Laffer revenue decreases with respect to y∗.
We have an evident contradiction. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us fix e ∈ [0, 1] and assume y∗ = 0.
By (23), we derive that a attains its maximum value a¯, since it decreases with
respect to y∗. Therefore, t∗(a¯) is maximum, by using relation (22). Since y∗
increases with respect to the tax rate, we have an evident contradiction. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us fix e ∈ [0, 1] and assume α = α¯ and t = t¯e,α¯.
Since y∗ decreases with respect to α, then
0 < y∗(t¯e,α¯, e, r(α)) < y∗(t¯e,α¯, e, r(α¯)), ∀α < α¯,
and the result is proved. 2
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